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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents an important question pertaining to 
the obligation of limited partners to return capital 
contributions distributed to them in violation of their 
partnership agreement which required that they establish 
reasonably necessary reserves. The issue is rendered 
complex by an interrelated maze of corporations and 
partnerships devised by the limited partners and the 
general partner in their efforts to develop two separate real 
estate projects. One of these, Timber Knolls, was aborted 
shortly after conception, and the other, Chestnut Woods, 
became the genesis of protracted litigation and of this 
appeal. 
 
The defendants-appellants are limited partners of Red 
Hawk North Associates, L.P. (Red Hawk) L.P., a New Jersey 
limited partnership. G&A Development Corporation (G&A) 
is the general partner of Red Hawk. Cedar Ridge 
Development Corporation (Cedar Ridge), a New Jersey 
corporation, and Red Hawk entered into a joint venture 
agreement, the Chestnut Woods Partnership (Chestnut), to 
develop, construct, and market residential homes in Bucks 
County, Pennsylvania. Red Hawk and Cedar Ridge are both 
general partners of Chestnut Woods. Under the joint 
venture agreement, Red Hawk would provide the funding 
and Cedar Ridge would provide the land which it previously 
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had agreed to purchase. Cedar Ridge would act as the 
managing partner and general contractor. 
 
On December 29, 1989, Cedar Ridge, as general 
contractor for Chestnut Woods, entered into a written 
subcontract with Henkels & McCoy, Inc. (Henkels), the 
plaintiff herein, to have it furnish the labor, materials, and 
equipment for the installation of the storm and sanitary 
sewer systems for the project. Cedar Ridge agreed to pay 
Henkels a fixed-price of $300,270 under the contract. 
Henkels completed the installation of the storm and sewer 
systems but Chestnut Woods defaulted in making the 
payments due under the contract. Henkels, a Pennsylvania 
corporation, then filed three actions in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; 
Henkels filed the first in December 1990 against Cedar 
Ridge and Red Hawk, trading as Chestnut Woods, for the 
balance due on the contract plus interest. The court 
entered a default judgment which was not satisfied in 
whole or part. 
 
Henkels then filed suit against G&A in its capacity as a 
general partner of Red Hawk and obtained a default 
judgment in the same amount as it had obtained against 
Cedar Ridge and Red Hawk. Efforts to obtain payment on 
this judgment also proved fruitless and counsel for the 
defendants advised plaintiff 's counsel by letter dated 
October 26, 1993 that Red Hawk was worthless. Henkels' 
counsel also had been advised that G&A was unable to pay 
the judgment out of its assets. 
 
Henkels finally brought this suit against the nineteen 
limited partners of Red Hawk (the Partners), standing in the 
shoes of the Red Hawk limited partnership; sixteen of the 
partners are parties to this appeal. Henkels sought, inter 
alia, to compel replacement of certain capital distributions 
made by Red Hawk to the limited partners aggregating 
$492,000 during the period that Cedar Ridge was obligated 
under its contract with Henkels to pay Henkels $300,270. 
Henkels alleged that the capital distributions were made in 
violation of the Red Hawk limited partnership agreement 
and S 42:2A-46(b) of the New Jersey Uniform Limited 
Partnership Law of 1976 (New Jersey ULPL). 
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After the district court denied both Henkels's and the 
Partners' motions for summary judgment,1  it conducted a 
bench trial and on January 6, 1997, entered judgment in 
favor of Henkels. The court held each limited partner of Red 
Hawk liable to Henkels for his proportionate share of 
liability in the total amount of $371,101.84 plus interest to 
the date of payment of any judgment. The Partners 
appealed. We affirm.2 
 
I. 
 
The following facts are undisputed and are based upon 
the stipulation of the parties and the findings of fact made 
by the district court. The Red Hawk partnership, consisting 
of 20 (1 deceased)3 limited partners and one corporate 
general partner, G&A, was formed in 1986. Pursuant to 
their partnership agreement, the Partners contributed $3.5 
million in capital which ultimately they allocated to two 
distinct partnership projects, Timber Knolls and Chestnut 
Woods. 
 
In 1987, Red Hawk and Cedar Ridge entered into a joint 
venture agreement forming the Chestnut Woods 
Partnership, with both Red Hawk and Cedar Ridge as 
general partners. Under the joint venture agreement, Red 
Hawk would provide the capital funds for the project and 
Cedar Ridge would provide the general management and 
assign its contract for the purchase of the land. Red Hawk 
funded the Partnership with an initial capital contribution 
of $650,000 (and an additional contribution of $200,000 in 
1988). Cedar Ridge agreed to act as both the managing 
partner and the general contractor of the Chestnut Woods 
project. In addition, Cedar Ridge had the right to incur 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Adochio, 906 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 
2. The district court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1332, as it is a civil action involving parties of diverse 
citizenship and the amount in controversy at the time the suit was filed 
in 1994 was in excess of the then existing $50,000 jurisdictional 
amount. This Court has appellate jurisdiction of the district court's 
final 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S1291. 
 
3. Conrad Strudler, a limited partner, died before trial and was no longer 
a defendant. 
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liabilities on behalf of the partnership in connection with 
the partnership's reasonable and legitimate business, 
borrow money in the name of the partnership, and incur 
reasonable and legitimate expenses related to the Chestnut 
Woods property. Work on the Chestnut Woods project 
subsequently commenced. 
 
In 1988, Red Hawk and Cedar Ridge entered into a 
second and distinct joint venture agreement to form the 
Timber Knolls partnership, under which both Red Hawk 
and Cedar Ridge were also general Partners. Red Hawk 
contributed $2.3 million to the Timber Knolls partnership 
and Cedar Ridge again agreed to act as both the managing 
partner and the general contractor of the project. Unlike the 
Chestnut Woods project, the Timber Knolls project never 
commenced operations. Therefore, in 1988, the Red Hawk 
Partners entered into an agreement with Cedar Ridge 
requiring the latter to return Red Hawk's $2.3 million 
capital contribution. As evidence of this obligation, Cedar 
Ridge executed promissory notes aggregating $2.3 million 
with interest and principal payable quarterly.4 Cedar Ridge 
made quarterly payments to Red Hawk on the notes, and 
G&A distributed these payments to the individual Red 
Hawk Partners, as follows: 
 
                      Payments by   Distributions by 
                      Cedar Ridge   G&A to the 
                      to Red Hawk   Red Hawk 
       Date           On the Notes  Partners 
 
       (1) Jan. 1989  $ 78,750      $ 76,200 
       (2) April 1989 $215,000      $207,900 
       (3) July 1989  $215,000      $207,900 
       Totals         $508,750      $492,000 
 
Meanwhile, on December 29, 1988, Cedar Ridge, in its 
role as general contractor of Chestnut Woods, bound itself 
to a $300,270 fixed-price contract with Henkels, under 
which Henkels agreed to furnish and install storm and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Each note initially called for quarterly interest of $78,750 only, with 
balloon payments of principal due on the third quarter of each year. In 
addition, the $2.3 million due was subsequently reduced to $2.1 million, 
with $200,000 transferred to Red Hawk's stake in Chestnut Woods, 
thereby increasing its investment to $850,000. 
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sanitary sewer systems for the Chestnut Woods 
development. The contract identified Cedar Ridge as the 
"General Contractor," Henkels as the "Subcontractor," and 
Chestnut Woods as the "Property Owner." The contract did 
not mention the relationship between Cedar Ridge and the 
Chestnut Woods Partnership, and made no reference to Red 
Hawk. It provided that the General Contractor, Cedar 
Ridge, was obligated to pay Henkels, payments to be made 
against billed invoices 30 days after approved inspection. At 
that time, Henkels was unaware that Cedar Ridge and Red 
Hawk were partners in Chestnut Woods. 
 
On January 16, 1989, Henkels commenced the 
installation of the Chestnut Woods storm and sewer 
systems and completed the work according to the contract 
in late 1989. Under the contract, Cedar Ridge was required 
to pay Henkels in progress payments as invoiced. 
Accordingly, Henkels invoiced Cedar Ridge and received 
payments as follows: 
 
  Invoice            Invoice  
  Date               Amount         Invoice  Status 
(1) Feb. 24, 1989    $ 37,632     paid in full  4/4/89  
(2) May 24, 1989     $ 33,421     paid in full 7/6/89  
(3) Aug. 14, 1989    $215,175     only $25,000 paid on 10/19/89 
(4) Sept. 28, 1989   $ 37,183     no payment 
(5) Nov. 9, 1989     $ 10,586     no payment          
 
                     $333,996     Total amount paid = $ 96,053 
                                  Total amount unpaid = $237,943 
 
Thus, Henkels received a partial payment in October on 
its August invoice and no payments on its September and 
November invoices, leaving a total unpaid balance of 
$237,943. G&A, the general partner for Red Hawk, failed to 
establish any reserves from the cash receipts of the limited 
partnership. 
 
On March 16, 1990, Cedar Ridge sold its assets to Red 
Hawk. Shortly thereafter, in April 1990, G&A agreed with 
Henkels to pay Cedar Ridge's outstanding obligations to it, 
including accrued interest. However, Cedar Ridge paid only 
two small payments aggregating $8,000. 
 
On December 19, 1990, Henkels sued Cedar Ridge and 
Red Hawk, trading as Chestnut Woods, claiming breach of 
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the installation contract and the April 1990 agreement, 
unjust enrichment, and conspiracy to defraud. Henkels 
obtained judgment against Cedar Ridge and Red Hawk in 
the amount of $282,421.55, including interest. Cedar Ridge 
and Red Hawk were unable to satisfy this judgment, in 
whole or in part. 
 
In June 1992, Henkels sued G&A in its capacity as 
general partner of Red Hawk for the amount of the 
judgment previously obtained against Cedar Ridge and Red 
Hawk. On August 12, 1992, the Henkels obtained a default 
judgment against G&A in the sum of $282,424.55 plus 
interest at 6% per annum from October 15, 1991. When 
Henkels learned that G&A was unable to satisfy this 
judgment in whole or in part, it filed the instant suit 
seeking to have the Partners return to Red Hawk the cash 
capital distributions they received in 1989 as limited 
partners so that Red Hawk could satisfy the judgment 
obtained by Henkels against it. 
 
The parties stipulated in the district court that the 
distributions made to the Red Hawk limited partners 
constituted a return of capital and that the distributions 
did not violate the New Jersey Limited Partnership Act. The 
district court concluded, however, in a careful and 
thorough opinion, that Paragraph 12(a) of the Red Hawk 
agreement of limited partnership governed the distribution 
of all cash receipts, except those derived from the operation 
of the property, and found that the payments on the 
promissory note from Cedar Ridge to Red Hawk did not 
constitute cash receipts derived from operations. It 
therefore held that the general partner was obligated to 
follow the mandate of Paragraph 12(a)(iv) of the partnership 
agreement which required the establishment of reasonable 
reserves prior to distributing cash receipts to the limited 
partners. 
 
The district court found that the general partner in Red 
Hawk failed to establish any reserves and that Red Hawk 
had knowledge of its contingent obligations in the Chestnut 
Woods project and knew or should have known of the 
strong potential that the assets of Chestnut Woods would 
not cover the expenses it continued to incur for site 
improvements by Henkels and for which Red Hawk was 
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ultimately responsible. Accordingly, it held that Red Hawk 
violated the partnership agreement by failing to establish 
reasonable reserves to cover the cost of the site 
improvements made by Henkels. 
 
The court accordingly entered a verdict in favor of 
Henkels and against the Partners individually for their 
proportionate share of liability in accordance with the 
monetary sums set forth in its conclusions of law in the 
total amount of $371,101.84 to date plus interest to the 
date of payment of any judgment. 
 
The Partners appealed. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, the Partners contend that the district court 
erred in holding that at the times of the distributions by 
Red Hawk to its limited partners, Henkels was a creditor of 
Red Hawk and that the distributions were made in violation 
of the partnership agreement. They also argue that even if 
Henkels were a creditor of Chestnut Woods, Red Hawk, as 
a Chestnut Woods partner, was not jointly and severally 
liable for the partnership debts (as a guarantor of payment) 
but rather only contingently liable as a guarantor of 
collection, and then only in the event Henkels obtained a 
judgment against the Chestnut Woods Partnership and 
failed to collect on such judgment. 
 
This Court reviews a district court's construction and 
application of the New Jersey Uniform Limited Partnership 
Law de novo. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 
225, 231 (1991); Schreiber v. Kellogg, 50 F.3d 264, 266 (3d 
Cir. 1995). However, whether Red Hawk and G&A breached 
the Red Hawk limited partnership agreement by failing to 
establish reasonably necessary reserves, and thus the 
Partners ultimately received the distributions in violation of 
the agreement, is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Accordingly, this Court exercises plenary review of the legal 
operation of the partnership agreement, but will vacate the 
district court's contract interpretations and subsidiary 
factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. See 
Cooper Lab., Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 802 
F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1986); Ram Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
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American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
 
As a preliminary matter, we must first address the Red 
Hawk Partners' argument that Henkels was not a creditor 
who had extended credit to Red Hawk at the time of the 
1989 capital distributions, and therefore the Partners were 
not liable to Henkels. The Partners base their argument on 
Section 42:2A-46(a) of New Jersey's ULPL, entitled "Liability 
upon return of contribution," which provides 
 
       a. If a limited partner has received the return of any 
       part of his contribution without violation of the 
       partnership agreement or this chapter, he is liable to 
       the limited partnership for a period of one year 
       thereafter for the amount of the returned contribution, 
       but only to the extent necessary to discharge the 
       limited partnership's liabilities to creditors who 
       extended credit to the limited partnership during the 
       period the contribution was held by the partnership. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 42:2A-46(a) (emphasis added). The 
Partners' reliance on this section is, however, misguided for 
several reasons: first, and most importantly, Henkels 
brought suit under Section 42:2A-46(b) not (a); second, 
subsection (b) is not in any way dependent upon nor does 
it even make cross reference to subsection (a); third, 
subsection (b) does not require that Henkels have extended 
credit or have been a creditor, nor does it even mention the 
word "creditor." Finally, subsection (b) addresses an entirely 
different concern than subsection (a): contributions made 
in violation of a partnership agreement or the New Jersey 
ULPL as opposed to distributions made without such 
violations but to the prejudice of creditors. Accordingly, 
Section 42:2A-46(a) is irrelevant to the issues raised on this 
appeal. 
 
Our analysis does not end with this conclusion, however, 
because as just mentioned, Henkels does allege that the 
distributions made by G&A to the Partners were illegal 
under Section 42:2A-46(b) of the New Jersey ULPL. Henkels 
specifically alleges that the distributions violated the New 
Jersey ULPL because they were made in violation of the Red 
Hawk partnership agreement. Accordingly, we confine our 
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analysis to the relevant sections of the partnership 
agreement in conjunction with Section 42:2A-46(b) which, 
in its entirety, reads as follows: 
 
       b. If a limited partner has received the return of any 
       part of his contribution in violation of the partnership 
       agreement or this chapter, he is liable to the limited 
       partnership for a period of six years thereafter for the 
       amount of the contribution wrongfully returned. 
 
(emphasis added). Section 12(a) of the Red Hawk 
partnership agreement specifically provided that cash 
receipts be used for the establishment of reasonable 
reserves (for creditors) before such receipts be distributed 
to the Partners.5 The Partners contend that the 
distributions were not made in violation of the partnership 
agreement because Henkels, under the sewer subcontract, 
at most was a creditor of only Cedar Ridge, not of either 
Chestnut Woods or Red Hawk. Thus Red Hawk, they argue, 
was not required to establish reserves. Pursuant to this 
reasoning, the Partners assert that because Henkels was 
not a creditor, they did not receive the 1989 distributions 
in violation of the partnership agreement and thus did not 
violate the New Jersey ULPL. 
 
The district court, however, committed no error when it 
found that Henkels was a creditor of Red Hawk even 
though Henkels was not in direct contractual privity with 
either Chestnut Woods or Red Hawk. The Partners contend 
that this was in error and that they could not be liable to 
Henkels because Cedar Ridge was acting solely in its 
capacity as general contractor and not as a partner in 
Chestnut Ridge when it entered into the contract with 
Henkels. Thus they contend that the contract did not bind 
Chestnut Woods or Red Hawk in any way. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 12, in pertinent part, provides that: 
 
        (a) Application of Cash Receipts.  Cash receipts shall be applied 
       in the following order of priority: 
 
        . . . 
 
        (iv) to the establishment of such reserves as the General Partner 
       shall reasonably deem necessary; and 
 
        (v) to distributions to the Partners . . . 
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In support of their argument, the Partners note that the 
Subcontract Agreement with Henkels identifies Cedar Ridge 
as the "General Contractor," Henkels as the 
"Subcontractor," makes no mention of Red Hawk, and 
merely lists the Chestnut Woods Partnership as the 
"Property Owner." The contract, signed only by Henkels and 
Cedar Ridge, also states that Henkels shall invoice and be 
paid by Cedar Ridge, and provides that the Chestnut Woods 
property shall not serve as security for payment or be 
subjected to liens. The Partners also consider significant 
that Henkels acknowledged that the contract was with 
Cedar Ridge only and that Henkels had no knowledge that 
Cedar Ridge or Red Hawk were partners in Chestnut 
Woods. The Partners argue that these facts conclusively 
establish that Cedar Ridge entered into the contract solely 
in its capacity as general contractor, not as a general 
partner of Chestnut Woods, and therefore Cedar Ridge is 
solely liable under the contract.6  
 
This "two hats" argument, although creative, is merely 
one of form over substance, ignoring the essence of the 
Chestnut Woods partnership agreement as well as 
fundamental principles of agency and partnership law 
which largely control the outcome of this case. First, the 
essence of the Chestnut Woods partnership agreement was 
that Red Hawk would "fund the PARTNERSHIP" by 
providing the capital with which to develop the property, 
while Cedar Ridge would contribute its development 
expertise by "act[ing] as the MANAGING PARTNER and 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR." (App. 76a, "Joint Venture 
Agreement, Chestnut Woods Partnership"). Thus, when 
Cedar Ridge signed the contract with Henkels as General 
Contractor, it simultaneously also was acting as a partner 
in the joint venture pursuant to its express authority to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Partners cite in their brief, In Re Moserbeth Assoc., 128 B.R. 716 
(E.D. Pa. 1991), as support for this argument. Moserbeth, however, is 
inapposite. In Moserbeth, the general contractor was not itself a partner 
in the limited partnership, but instead was a separate and distinct 
corporation owned 100% by a partner in the partnership. This separate 
and distinct corporate identity was critical to the Moserbeth court 
holding that the partnership was not liable for the debts of the general 
contractor. 
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"act as the . . . GENERAL CONTRACTOR" as provided in 
the Chestnut Woods partnership / joint venture agreement. 
Second, it is elementary that "[e]very partner is an agent of 
the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act 
of every partner . . . binds the partnership, unless the 
partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the 
partnership in the particular matter." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 42:1-9(1); see also Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 170 A.2d 241, 
243 (N.J. 1961); Restatement (Second) of AgencySS 12, 140 
(1958). This principle holds true even when, as here, the 
principal is undisclosed and the agent signs the contract in 
his individual capacity for the benefit of the partnership. 
But when a third party creditor ascertains an agency 
relationship, it may hold the partnership as principal liable 
(and ultimately the individual partners) even though the 
creditor was unaware of the agency relationship at the time 
that he extended the credit to the agent. See Looman Realty 
Corp. v. Broad St. Nat'l Bank of Trenton, 161 A.2d 247, 255- 
56 (N.J. 1960) ("The principal, if discovered, may also be a 
party to the contract."); Levy v. Iavarone, 154 A. 527 (N.J. 
1931) (seller can recover from partner, although seller did 
not know at the time credit was extended to the partner's 
agent that a partnership relationship existed between the 
partner and the agent); Yates v. Repetto, 47 A. 632, 633 
(N.J. 1900) (when credit is given to an agent, and the 
principal is unknown, the creditor may elect upon 
disclosure of the principal, to hold either the agent or the 
principal liable); Moss v. Jones, 225 A.2d 369, 371 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) ("If the existence of the principal 
is not known until after [a judgment against the agent goes 
unsatisfied], then the undisclosed principal may be sued, 
notwithstanding the judgment against the agent."); 
Restatement (Second) of Agency SS 186, 190, 194, 195 
(1958). 
 
Here, it is undisputed that Red Hawk was a partner with 
Cedar Ridge in the Chestnut Woods Partnership, that Cedar 
Ridge had actual authority to enter into the contract with 
Henkels,7 that the sewer systems were being installed for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Paragraph 13.1(b) of the Chestnut Woods partnership agreement 
delegated to the managing partner, Cedar Ridge, general management 
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the benefit of the Chestnut Woods Partnership, and that 
Cedar Ridge was entitled to reimbursement from Chestnut 
Woods for all monies paid by Cedar Ridge to Henkels. 
Accordingly, the district court committed no error when it 
ruled that, although indirect, a creditor relationship existed 
between Red Hawk and Henkels based on the contract 
signed by Red Hawk's partner in the Chestnut Woods 
Partnership, Cedar Ridge. 
 
The Partners also argue that the district court erred in 
finding that Henkels was a creditor of Red Hawk, because, 
even assuming arguendo that a contractual relationship 
existed between Red Hawk and Henkels, Henkels had not 
extended any credit to Cedar Ridge, Chestnut Woods, or 
Red Hawk. The unpaid invoices at issue here are from 
August, September, and November 1989, whereas the 
distributions to the Red Hawk Partners were made prior, in 
January, April, and July 1989. Therefore, the Partners 
claim that this is in itself prima facie proof that Henkels 
was not a creditor -- i.e., Henkels was not owed any money 
at the time of the distributions. These arguments, however, 
take a very narrow and ultimately erroneous legal view of 
the contractual relationship with Henkels and even a more 
constricted view of the definition of creditor. 
 
Although the term creditor is undefined in the New 
Jersey ULPL and there is no New Jersey case law 
interpreting the term in this context, the term creditor is 
not foreign to New Jersey law. For instance, many New 
Jersey statutes define creditor very broadly to include "the 
holder of any claim, of whatever character, . . . whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
authority and decision making power, including: "[t]he right to incur 
liabilities on behalf of the [Chestnut Woods Partnership] in connection 
with the reasonable and legitimate business of the [Chestnut Woods 
Partnership]." In addition, Paragraph 13.1(n) delegated the right and 
power "to enter into such contracts or agreements deemed necessary or 
appropriate on behalf of the [Chestnut Woods Partnership]." It is 
significant that these provisions, unlike paragraphs 13.1(d), (g), (j), 
(l), & 
(m), allowed Cedar Ridge to incur "on behalf of the [Chestnut Woods 
Partnership]," and did not require that it incur liabilities and enter 
contracts only "in the name of the [Chestnut Woods Partnership]." 
(emphasis added). 
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secured or unsecured, matured or unmatured, liquidated or 
unliquidated, absolute or contingent." See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 14A:14-1(b) (Business Corporation Act); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 15A:12-18(c) (Nonprofit Corporation Act); and N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 25:2-7 (Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act) 
(repealed), & N.J. Stat. Ann. S 12A:6-109 cmt. (UCC Bulk 
Transfers) (repealed). Cf. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan 
Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (to 
qualify as creditor, a party's claim must be based on "some 
legal foundation, such as an underlying debt, a contract, or 
a lawsuit"). Also, the statute is remedial in nature, 
"designed to protect creditors and should be interpreted 
with this purpose in mind." Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 906 F. 
Supp. at 252-53. In addition, the generic common law 
definition of creditor is very broad and 
 
       includes every one having [the] right to require the 
       performance of any legal obligation [or] contract, . . . or 
       a legal right to damages growing out of [a] contract or 
       tort, and includes not merely the holder of a fixed and 
       certain present debt, but every one having a right to 
       require the performance of any legal obligation [or] 
       contract, . . . or a legal right to damages growing out 
       of [a] contract or tort. 
 
Black's Law Dictionary 368 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis 
added). Finally, the failure of the statute to define creditor 
is indicative of the New Jersey legislature's intent that the 
term "creditor" be construed consistent with the New Jersey 
ULPL's broad remedial purpose and its common usage. See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 1:1-1 (General rules of construction). The 
district court cited many of these reasons and found them 
sufficiently persuasive, as do we, to adopt a broad 
definition of creditor which includes unmatured payments 
of a debt upon performance under a contract such as 
Henkels's. 
 
Pursuant to the subcontract agreement, Henkels had a 
claim to payment for a fixed contract price to be paid in 
installments upon progressive completion of the sewer 
work. Although the Partners argue that Henkels did not 
have a claim at the time of the 1989 distributions, the 
contract between Henkels and Cedar Ridge was entered 
into on December 29, 1988. Thus Henkels and Cedar Ridge 
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had definite obligations to each other under the contract 
over a week prior to the first distribution by the general 
partner to the Red Hawk limited partners. Those obligations 
required Henkels to make the site improvements and Cedar 
Ridge to make scheduled payments as performance was 
rendered. In addition, G&A made the bulk of the 
distributions after Henkels had commenced work and was 
incurring costs and expenses in fulfilling its commitments 
under the contract. Thus Chestnut Woods and Red Hawk 
had incurred liability as early as December 29, 1988, 
although the bulk of the payment matured the month after 
the last distribution by Red Hawk to the Partners. The 
Partners' overly narrow definition of creditor is inconsistent 
with the obvious financial realities that existed at the time, 
the generally accepted common law meaning of the term, 
the broad definition used in other New Jersey statutory 
contexts, and the broad remedial purpose of the statute. 
Accordingly, we hold that under this broad definition and 
consistent with the principles of agency and partnership 
law previously discussed, Henkels was not only a creditor 
of Cedar Ridge, but of Chestnut Woods, and thus Red 
Hawk and its partners. 
 
The Partners further argue that even if we conclude that 
Henkels was a creditor of Chestnut Woods, Red Hawk was 
not "jointly and severally" liable for the partnership's debts, 
but only "jointly" liable, as it was only a partner in 
Chestnut Woods. The Partners find this significant and 
contend that as a partner Red Hawk was only contingently 
liable as a guarantor of collection, not as a guarantor of 
payment. Furthermore, the Partners contend that even then 
Red Hawk was not liable until Henkels had obtained a 
judgment against the Chestnut Woods partnership, was 
unable to collect, and then sought payment from Chestnut 
Woods's partner, Red Hawk. Therefore, the Partners 
conclude, Henkels was not a creditor of Red Hawk until 
this eventuality ultimately did occur in October 1991-- 
more than two years after the distributions. Thus, they 
assert there was no violation of Section 42:2A-46(b) or the 
partnership agreement. Although the Partners make much 
of the distinction between "joint" and "joint and several 
liability," and between "guarantor of collection" and 
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"guarantor of payment," the distinctions between these 
terms are illusory here and are not dispositive. 
 
Under the New Jersey ULPL, partners are only jointly 
liable for contract obligations of the partnership, and thus 
a contract creditor of the partnership must first exhaust 
the partnership's assets before it can pursue the assets of 
the individual partners. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 42:1-15(b). 
The Partners dwell on their argument that joint liability 
means that partners are merely guarantors of collection 
rather than guarantors of payment, citing Seventy-Three 
Land, Inc. v. Maxlaw Partners, 637 A.2d 202 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1994). They contend that this distinction 
means that Henkels was not a creditor of Red Hawk until 
after it obtained a judgment against Red Hawk's assets in 
October 1991, "long after the distributions to the limited 
partners were made." 
 
This argument is without merit, however, because the 
Partners overly emphasize the distinction between 
guarantor of collection and guarantor of payment by 
ignoring the sentence in Seventy-Three Land, Inc. 
immediately preceding the courts' discussion of this 
distinction; that sentence actually supports an opposite 
conclusion. The court in Seventy-Three Land, Inc. merely 
stated that "[p]artners are liable for partnership contract 
debts, but their assets are not at risk until it is shown that 
the partnership cannot discharge the debt." Id. at 204 
(emphasis added). This language, consistent with the broad 
definition of creditor previously discussed, clearly 
demonstrates that jointly liable partners such as Red Hawk 
do have a present liability. The significance to the Red 
Hawk Partners is that payment of that liability out of their 
individual assets is contingent, rather than fixed, until the 
partnership's assets are first exhausted. Although the 
Partners' individual assets were only contingently at risk, 
the Partners nonetheless were liable to Henkels from the 
time the contract was signed and, as ultimately did happen, 
their assets did become available when the Red Hawk 
partnership's assets proved insufficient to meet its debt 
with Henkels. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court's finding that 
Henkels was a creditor of Red Hawk was correct. See 
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Henkels & McCoy, 906 F. Supp. at 252-53. At the time of 
the 1989 distributions, Henkels was a creditor of Red Hawk 
and the individual Red Hawk partners were liable for that 
debt.8 
 
III. 
 
Although Henkels was a creditor of Red Hawk, the 1989 
distributions were in violation of the partnership agreement 
only if, as Henkels argues, Red Hawk's distributions 
constituted a failure to abide by the partnership 
agreement's requirement to establish reasonably necessary 
reserves. The Partners, however, contend that the district 
court made several errors in interpreting the Red Hawk 
partnership agreement which resulted in its finding that 
the distributions were in violation of the agreement by 
failing to establish such reasonable reserves. 
 
Section 9(b) of the partnership agreement grants the 
general partner, G&A, certain rights and powers, including, 
under subsection (ix), the power "to establish reasonable 
reserve funds from income derived from the Partnership's 
operations to provide for future . . . debt service or similar 
requirements." The Partners argue that this subsection is 
the only subsection of the agreement that permits or 
authorizes the general partner to reserve funds. Thus, 
according to the Partners, all reserves had to be (1) 
authorized by this subsection, (2) taken from income 
derived from operations, and (3) used for debt service. 
Therefore, had G&A reserved funds against the Henkels 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The dissent would extend our holding far beyond its limit. It concludes 
that the majority holds "by necessary implication. . . that a distribution 
could not be made to Red Hawk partners unless cash reserves had been 
established to fund the payment of all anticipated future liabilities of 
the 
joint venture partnerships (owned in part by others) that might accrue 
over some unspecified period of time . . . ." Dissent at p. 30. We are not 
called upon in this case to decide whether reserves are required for "all 
anticipated future liabilities" and therefore the majority does not decide 
that question, either directly or by implication. The focus of our holding 
is merely that when there is clear liability under an existing contract, 
the 
equity partners cannot ignore that liability, recapture their capital 
investments, and leave the creditor spinning in the wind. 
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contract, the Partners contend that such reserves would 
have been taken in violation of this subsection of the 
partnership agreement because the funds would not have 
been derived from operations but from distributions of 
capital. 
 
The Partners' argument fails, however, because it 
selectively presents the language of Sections 9 and 12 and 
omits other relevant language which demonstrates that the 
Partners greatly overemphasize the significance of 
subsection (ix). First, the express language of Section 9(b) 
provides that the general partner possess all "rights and 
powers required for or appropriate to its management of the 
partnership's business which, by way of illustration but not 
by way of limitation, shall include the following: . . . (ix) to 
establish reasonable reserve funds from income derived 
from the partnership's operations to provide for future . . . 
debt service or similar requirements." This unambiguous 
language demonstrates that G&A had the right and power 
to establish reserves, even if not expressly authorized under 
subsection (ix), if it deemed them required or appropriate 
for the management of Red Hawk's business. The list of 
rights and powers in subsection (ix) is merely illustrative 
and is not an exclusive limitation on the general partner's 
rights and powers. 
 
Equally important, as the district court properly found, 
the distributions at issue here were not taken from income 
derived from operations, but were merely returns of capital 
of the aborted Timber Knolls partnership, which, as Red 
Hawk admits, "never got off the ground." Income from 
"operations," as used in this subsection, refers to income 
derived from the active, normal, on-going activities of the 
partnership. Timber Knolls never functioned, and thus 
there never was any income from operations. Therefore, 
subsection (ix) is not applicable to the distributions at issue 
here.9 It is completely irrelevant because the distributions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. This point is significant in interpreting Section 12(a) as well. 
Following 
the order of priority for the distributions of cash receipts in Section 
12(a)(i)-(v) is a provision which prohibits the general partner from 
"retain[ing] and invest[ing] any Cash Receipts derived from the operations 
of the Property, except . . . (2) for investments of reserves permitted to 
be established under clause (ix) of Paragraph 9(b)." (emphasis added). 
Because the cash receipts used to fund the distributions were not 
derived from income from operations of Red Hawk property, this 
prohibition is not relevant to this appeal. 
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constituted capital funds retrieved by Red Hawk from its 
abandoned project, Timber Knolls. Although the Partners 
emphasize that the funds were derived from the Timber 
Knolls project, Subsection (ix) only addresses the reserving 
of funds derived from operations; the germinating project is 
immaterial. 
 
Finally, as previously discussed, Henkels qualified as a 
creditor of Red Hawk at the time the distributions were 
made. Therefore, pursuant to Section 12(a) of the Red Hawk 
limited partnership agreement governing the distribution of 
all cash receipts, the Red Hawk general partner was 
required to establish reasonable reserves from the cash 
received on the Timber Knolls promissory notes to meet its 
ongoing liability before distributing such cash to the 
individual limited partners. We, therefore, turn to the issue 
as to what would constitute a "reasonable" reserve to meet 
the outstanding liability under the Henkels subcontract. 
 
Although neither party provided the district court with 
any case law or treatise defining reasonable reserves, the 
court used the Black's Law Dictionary definition of 
"reasonable" and of "reserves" in the insurance context to 
define reasonable reserves in the business context before 
us. We agree with them that the insurance context is 
inappropriate for analysis because the nature of the 
insurance business differs significantly from that of an 
ordinary business partnership. Unlike an ordinary business 
partnership, an insurance company essentially is required 
to meet future, contingent obligations, and these reserves 
are required. The Partners instead propose that the highly 
deferential corporate "business judgment" standard is the 
appropriate standard. However, as Henkels correctly 
argues, the business judgment rule also is inapposite in the 
partnership context because it is a function of a unique 
corporate setting. See 3A William Meade Fletcher et al., 
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
SS1036-37 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1994). 
 
Although the New Jersey courts have not yet addressed 
the issue of what constitutes reasonable reserves, we do not 
need to expressly define reasonable reserves in the context 
of this case because it is unnecessary to the disposition of 
this appeal. See Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 
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F.3d 476, 486 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to decide issues 
unnecessary to the appeal); Georgine v. Amchem Products, 
Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e believe it 
prudent not to decide issues unnecessary to the disposition 
of the case."). Regardless of what standard the New Jersey 
courts will ultimately adopt, under any standard and using 
any definition of reasonable reserves, the Red Hawk general 
partner's failure to establish any reserves in the face of the 
fixed obligation and imminent payments due under the 
contract with Henkels and the operations of the Chestnut 
Woods development was callous and not reasonable. 
 
It is undisputed that of the approximately $500,000 
monies received by Red Hawk in 1989, the Red Hawk 
general partner (G&A) did not set aside any of these funds 
to establish reserves, even in the face of a contracted 
liability. Red Hawk argues, however, that this was not 
unreasonable because (1) the Red Hawk partnership had no 
liabilities and $3 million in assets at the time of the 
distributions; (2) Henkels had not yet invoiced Chestnut 
Woods; (3) the financial outlook of Red Hawk (& Chestnut 
Woods) was healthy; and (4) the express terms of the 
partnership agreement prohibited the taking of such 
reserves. Each of these contentions is without merit. 
 
First, the $3 million of assets included on Red Hawk's 
January 1, 1989 balance sheet is somewhat illusory. Of the 
$3 million in assets, a scant $22,000 was in the form of 
cash or other liquid assets. The remaining were almost 
exclusively illiquid: the $800,000 investment in the 
Chestnut Woods project itself which consisted of land and 
infrastructure and the $2.1 million Timber Knolls notes 
receivable from Cedar Ridge -- which were substantially 
distributed to the limited partners. Neither of these assets 
were readily available to satisfy Red Hawk obligations, 
especially not after the payments on the notes were 
distributed to the partners. Moreover, Red Hawk repeatedly 
left almost no money in its checking account after each 
distribution to the Partners, other than several thousand 
dollars to cover incidental operating expenses. Additionally, 
the absence of any formal liabilities from its balance sheet 
and the failure of Henkels to physically invoice Cedar Ridge 
did not mean that Red Hawk had no liabilities; it simply 
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was an "off-balance sheet" liability. In the accounting 
profession, an "off-balance sheet" liability is a financial 
obligation that is not formally recognized in an entity's 
accounting statements because no "accounting" obligation 
arises until the exchange transactions is completed; 
nonetheless, they do have real current and future cash flow 
consequences. See Accountant's Handbook, 10.29 (7th ed. 
1991). Under the broad definition of creditor established 
above, Red Hawk had an unmatured, fixed, off-balance 
sheet liability to Henkels. 
 
Although by itself this may be not determinative, more 
telling is the Partners' failure to identify any other source of 
funds from which the Red Hawk Partnership would be able 
to meet its obligations, including its contract obligation to 
Henkels. The Timber Knolls project never got off the 
ground, literally and figuratively, and based on the record, 
Chestnut Woods generated no earnings during the 1989 tax 
year and Red Hawk generated none during both 1988 and 
1989. Because the Chestnut Woods property was under 
development at the time, Chestnut Woods reported a loss 
during 1989 and Red Hawk reported losses on both its 
1988 and 1989 tax returns, and both Chestnut Woods and 
Red Hawk appear to have had negative cash flows during 
these years. Without any other source of cash or liquid 
assets, short of liquidating the Chestnut Woods property 
itself, it clearly was unreasonable for G&A to distribute to 
the Partners Red Hawk's only available source of payment 
without setting aside any reserves to meet the Henkels debt.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. As we noted above, see supra p. 10, under the New Jersey 
partnership statute and fundamental principles of agency law, every 
partner is an agent of the partnership and the act of every partner binds 
the partnership for the purpose of its business. Accordingly, the 
liability 
of the Red Hawk partnership to Henkels was committed by written 
contract between Henkels and Red Hawk's partner, Cedar Ridge, in 
December 1988, before any retrieval by the Partners of their capital 
investment in Timber Knolls. In addition, Red Hawk's project, Chestnut 
Woods, had current liabilities as of January 1, 1989, according to its tax 
returns, which disclosed debts of over $1.7 million. These liabilities 
also 
were in place prior to the retrieval of the Partners' investments in Red 
Hawk. Nevertheless, the dissent would relieve the Partners of any 
liability under the contract to creditor Henkels on the theory that from 
January to August 1989, Red Hawk "had no significant liabilities of any 
kind." Dissent at p. 29. 
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Second, and equally telling, G&A knew, or at least had 
ample notice, that the financial outlook of Red Hawk and 
Chestnut Woods was not as rosy at the time of the 
distributions as the Partners attempt to assert now. 11 For 
example, the Partners fail to mention or accurately state 
many of the following facts: (1) Red Hawk and G&A, in 
December 1988, received notification from Cedar Ridge that 
four separate and distinct types of delays in the Chestnut 
Woods project were resulting in additional financial 
burdens to it; (2) Cedar Ridge also informed Red Hawk that 
these financial burdens were worrisome given the decline 
already experienced in the housing market; (3) Red Hawk 
had a scant $22,000 in cash or other liquid assets on hand 
as of January 1, 1989; (4) Chestnut Woods had an equally 
scant $12,000 in cash or other liquid assets on hand as of 
January 1, 1989; (5) Chestnut Woods' January 1, 1989 
balance sheet showed over $1.7 million in current 
liabilities, with the land and construction in progress of 
Chestnut Woods comprising over 90% of its $2.4 million in 
assets, leaving meager resources available to pay for the 
planned 1989 site improvements, such as the $300,000 of 
sewer systems from Henkels;12 (6) as of March 7, 1989, Red 
Hawk had, at a minimum, imputed knowledge from its 
bank's written notice that interest on the Chestnut Woods 
mortgage would no longer be paid out of the interest 
reserve fund and that Cedar Ridge was responsible to pay 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Even assuming arguendo that Red Hawk and G&A did not have 
actual notice or knowledge of the precarious financial condition of 
Chestnut Woods, "[t]here are many cases stating the general rule that 
knowledge of one partner [(Cedar Ridge)] will be imputed to the others." 
Harold Gill Reuschlein & William A. Gregory, The Law of Agency and 
Partnership S200 at 304 (1990); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. S 42:1-12 
("Knowledge to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs 
. . . operate[s] as notice to or knowledge of the partnership . . . ."); 
Claflin 
v. Wolff, 96 A. 73, 79 (N.J. 1915) ("If any of [the partners] had notice 
or 
knowledge . . . they would all be affected by it."). 
 
12. Red Hawk states, and its 1989 tax return shows, that Chestnut 
Woods' assets were $2.4 million, not $1.8 million. Although the district 
court found the number to be $1.8 million, this difference is 
inconsequential; either amount consisted almost exclusively of the 
project's land and work-in-progress -- i.e., illiquid assets, leaving next 
to 
nothing to pay its $1.7 million in current liabilities. 
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interest out of its own funds due to "the past unfortunate 
circumstances [which] caused slower than expected 
[progress on the Chestnut Woods project,]" and which 
caused the remaining interest reserve to become 
substantially depleted and potentially "insufficient to carry 
this loan;" and (7) the August 1989 $2.7 million appraisal 
of the Chestnut Woods project was merely a potential future 
retail estimate and contained the express caveat that this 
"value estimate[ ] assume[s] that all site improvements will 
be completed in a workmanlike manner and within a 
reasonable period of time."13 
 
Finally, as previously discussed, the Red Hawk 
partnership agreement did not prohibit G&A from reserving 
funds for the payment of Henkels. Section 9(b)(ix) is merely 
an illustration of G&A's rights and powers and, because the 
funds at issue were not derived from operations, ultimately 
was irrelevant to the funds at issue. More importantly, 
Section 12(a) expressly required that the available cash 
funds be used to establish reserves before they were 
distributed to the Partners. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The dissent ignores the foregoing realities of Red Hawk's and 
Chestnut Woods' financial straits while the Chestnut Woods project was 
still under development, and already beset by a negative cash flow in the 
project, while at the same time the Partners were retrieving all of their 
total capital investments in the Timber Knolls project. The dissent, 
again, would permit the Partners to escape liability in the face of 
Henkels' 1988 contract on the infirm premise that at the end of August 
1989, when all partner contributions had been repaid, Chestnut Woods 
had the project appraised at $2.7 million and Red Hawk "had significant 
net worth throughout this period." Dissent at p. 30. In the first place, 
the appraisal obtained by Chestnut Woods was merely an optimistic, 
potential, retail figure dependent on the market price for the lots, when 
and if sold, and the completion of the project "in a workmanlike manner 
and within a reasonable period of time." Second, even if the appraisal of 
the project were accurate, the frozen nature of the real estate -- not yet 
marketable -- provided no liquid source for payment of ongoing 
obligations. To illustrate, it could not meet the payment due of $215,175 
for the August delivery by Henkels. Further significant, Red Hawk and 
Chestnut Woods both reported losses during 1989, and both appear to 
have had negative cash flows. Both had meager sums of cash on hand, 
and Chestnut Woods had significant current liabilities with 90% of its 
assets frozen. 
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Although neither Henkels nor the district court attempted 
to determine what level of reserves was reasonable, no 
determination was needed because Red Hawk and G&A 
failed to establish any reserves. It is patently obvious that 
at least some level of reserves was reasonably necessary, 
and that the general partners' distributions and failure to 
reserve any money for the Henkels contract obligation, in 
light of Chestnut Woods' and Red Hawk's precarious 
financial condition, was unreasonable. Thus, the district 
court did not need to determine what level of reserves was 
reasonable; it clearly had an ample factual basis upon 
which to determine that the complete failure to establish 
any reserves was a violation of the Red Hawk partnership 
agreement's requirement that G&A establish some level of 
reserves before making distributions to the Partners. 
Accordingly, we hold that Red Hawk's failure to establish 
any reserves in light of both partnerships' then existing 
financial condition was not reasonable. 
 
IV. 
 
In conclusion, we find no merit to appellants' 
contentions. We see no error in the district court's 
conclusion that Henkels was a creditor of Red Hawk, and 
therefore the 1989 capital distributions to the Partners and 
failure to establish any reserves to fund its contract 
obligation to Henkels was a violation of the Red Hawk 
partnership agreement. The Partners are therefore obligated 
to return the improper capital distributions to Red Hawk. 
Because the plaintiff stands in the shoes of Red Hawk for 
the purpose of recovering these funds on behalf of the 
partnership, In re: Sharps Run Associates, 157 B.R. 766, 
772-73 (D.N.J. 1993), and because of the multiple suits it 
already has been compelled to undergo to enforce collection 
of its debt, judicial resources will be conserved and 
economies of time and expenses effectuated, to hold the 
Partners directly liable to Henkels. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
affirmed. Costs taxed against the appellants. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
The critical issue posed by this appeal is one of intent - 
the intent of the Red Hawk partners when they negotiated 
their partnership agreement. Given the text of that 
agreement and the context in which it was executed, I 
believe the district court clearly erred when it interpreted 
Section 12(a)(iv) as precluding the three challenged 
payments to Red Hawk's limited partners. 
 
The relevant facts are documented and undisputed. Red 
Hawk is a limited partnership organized under the New 
Jersey Uniformed Limited Partnership Law to facilitate the 
investment of its corporate general partner and its 
individual limited partners in two specific real estate 
developments. The sole declared purpose of the partnership 
was to participate in two joint ventures pursuant to 
identified, previously executed joint venture agreements, 
each of which would independently develop a parcel of real 
estate in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. The Timber Knoll 
joint venture was to develop the Timber Knoll property; the 
Chestnut Woods joint venture was to develop the Chestnut 
Woods property. In each instance, management of the joint 
venture was placed in the hands of an unrelated 
corporation with experience in the business of real estate 
development, the Cedar Ridge Development Corporation. 
The partners of Red Hawk contributed to it capital of $3.5 
million. Of this capital, $2.3 million was committed to the 
Timber Knoll joint venture, and $850,000 was committed to 
the Chestnut Woods joint venture. It was understood that 
Cedar Ridge would be simultaneously involved in other real 
estate development projects in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
and other states. 
 
Under the Chestnut Woods joint venture agreement, 
Cedar Ridge, as the "Managing Partner," was authorized to 
borrow money and to mortgage and sell assets. Red Hawk 
was to receive a Preferred Minimum Return on Capital prior 
to any distribution of profits to Cedar Ridge. The preferred 
return was equal to 15% "per annum based on simple 
interest payable quarterly on the amount of capital 
outstanding and not returned." J.A. at 91. However, "in the 
event the net cash working reserve of the [joint venture fell] 
below $500,000, the quarterly preferred return [could] be 
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deferred by the MANAGING PARTNER until the net cash 
working reserve has sufficient cash in excess of $500,000 
to pay the unpaid preferred return." J.A. at 91-92. The 
agreement further provided that no partners would have 
"the right to compel a distribution of profits or cash, unless 
the [joint venture] has accumulated an unwarranted 
amount of cash not reasonably needed for future business 
activities." J.A. at 93-94. Red Hawk's capital contribution 
was to be returned at the minimum rate of $12,400 per lot 
sold after the sale of the first 20 lots. In addition, the 
managing partner committed itself to "make a good faith 
effort to make minimum annual cash distributions equal to 
thirty-five percent (35%) of the distributive share of profits 
allocated to each PARTNER" for tax purposes. J.A. at 94. 
Distributions could be made in cash or property. 
 
It was in the context of this joint venture agreement and 
the similar Timber Knoll joint venture agreement that the 
Red Hawk Partnership Agreement was negotiated. Since the 
Red Hawk partners understood that cash flow would be 
coming to Red Hawk from the managing partner of the joint 
ventures only after Cedar Ridge had established reserves to 
service the only business operations in which Red Hawk 
would ever have an interest, the Red Hawk limited partners 
understandably sought assurance that joint venture profits 
and return of capital would not be accumulated in the Red 
Hawk partnership by its general partner, G&A. 
 
The Red Hawk Partnership Agreement thus provided for 
a mandatory pass-through of cash receipts, whether 
generated by the joint ventures in the regular course of 
business or otherwise, after the general partner had paid all 
of the currently due debt obligations of Red Hawk and had 
set aside specifically limited reserves. Any reserves were 
expressly limited to such revenue from operations as the 
general partner, in its discretion, considered appropriate for 
the purpose of paying anticipated administrative expenses 
and, in the event of the distribution of joint venture 
property in kind, anticipated property management 
expenses. Section 12(a) of the agreement thus provided: 
 
       (a) Application of Cash Receipts. Cash Receipts shall 
       be applied in the following order of priority: 
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       (i) to the extent required, to the creditors of the 
       Partnership, except to any Partner or any 
       Affiliate thereof; 
 
       (ii) to the extend required, to the payment of any 
       debts or liabilities to any Partner or any 
       Affiliate thereof (other than a loan to the 
       Partnership by the Partner); 
 
       (iii) to the payment in full of any loans to the 
       Partnership by a Partner; 
 
       (iv) to the establishment of such reserves as the 
       General Partner shall reasonably deem 
       necessary; and 
 
       (v) to distributions to the Partners in accordance 
       with Paragraphs 12(b) and (c) hereof. 
 
        Notwithstanding the foregoing, the General Partner 
       shall not retain and invest any Cash Receipts derived 
       from the operations of the Property, except (1) to defray 
       expenditures for any repair or improvement to any 
       Property, which it, in its sole discretion, deems 
       appropriate or (2) for investments of reserves permitted 
       to be established under clause (ix) of Paragraph 9(b) 
       hereof, nor shall the General Partner invest the net 
       proceeds derived and retained by the Partnership from 
       the sale or other disposition of any Property (including 
       any total condemnation or destruction of any portion of 
       the Property) except as otherwise provided herein. 
 
J.A. at 274. 
 
The term "Property" is defined in the Red Hawk 
Agreement to mean "the Buildings and Land in Bucks 
County, Pennsylvania." J.A. at 261. "Cash Receipts" means 
"all cash receipts of the Partnership from whatever source 
derived." J.A. at 259. Section 9 of that Agreement is entitled 
"Rights and Duties of the General Partner." It imposes no 
duty on the General Partner to set aside reserves for any 
purpose. In subsection (b)(ix), the subsection referenced in 
Section 12(a), the general partner is given the authority "to 
establish reasonable reserve funds from income derived 
from the Partnership's operations to provide for future 
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maintenance, repair, replacement, debt service or similar 
requirements." J.A. at 265. 
 
Read in the context of the Agreement and the 
expectations of the Partners, it is apparent that the 
dominant portion of Sections 12(a) is the paragraph 
commencing with the clause "Notwithstanding the 
foregoing." Indeed, that lead clause requires that this 
paragraph be given controlling significance over the 
preceding text. It mandates disbursement to the partners of 
all cash whether received by Red Hawk in the course of the 
normal operations of the joint venture properties or 
whether received by it from dispositions of joint venture 
property other than in the course of its regular business 
operations. The two exceptions recognize that the General 
Partner, in its sole discretion, should have the ability to 
retain cash derived from operations to establish reasonable 
reserves for property repairs and improvement, debt 
service, and other operating expenses. 
 
The subordinate portion of Section 12(a) that precedes 
the "notwithstanding" clause establishes the priorities 
among various interests that may compete for distributions 
of cash receipts. The purpose of subsection 12(a)(iv), in 
particular, is (1) to recognize the possibility that the 
General Partner may wish to withhold some funds 
pursuant to the two express exceptions from theflow 
through mandate; and (2) to emphasize that the General 
Partner's authority to do so is limited to such reserves as it 
might "reasonably deem necessary." Thus, subsection 12(a) 
is designed both to recognize the possibility of retention of 
cash receipts for authorized reserves at the discretion of the 
General Partner and, at the same time, to assure the 
limited partners that there will be no accumulation of even 
funds for reserves when the general partner, in the exercise 
of business judgment, could not reasonably regard them as 
necessary for the designated purposes. 
 
The Timber Knoll project never got off the ground. The 
requisite governmental approvals for development were not 
obtained by the owner of the Timber Knoll site, and the 
property was never purchased by the joint venture. When it 
appeared that the objective of the joint venture would have 
to be abandoned, an amendment to the joint venture 
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agreement was executed that called for the conversion of 
Red Hawk's $2.3 million capital contribution into 
promissory notes of Cedar Ridge. Pursuant to these notes, 
payments were received by Red Hawk in January 1989, 
April 1989, and July 1989. These payments represented a 
return of the capital contribution made by Red Hawk to the 
Timber Knoll joint venture and interest accrued thereon 
after the conversion. 
 
The Chestnut Woods project did get underway in late 
1988. Cedar Ridge served the Chestnut Woods joint venture 
not only as managing partner, but also as "general 
contractor" for the site improvements. The site 
improvements were to be financed, at least in part, through 
bank borrowing. Among these improvements were, of 
course, storm and sanitary sewer systems. Cedar Ridge, in 
its capacity as "general contractor," contracted with plaintiff 
Henkels & McCoy in December of 1988. Henkels 
commenced its work at the Chestnut Woods site on 
January 16, 1989, shortly after Red Hawk received the first 
payment on the return of its capital contribution to the 
Timber Knoll joint venture. 
 
In January, April and July of 1989, Red Hawk's general 
partner made the decisions that gave rise to this lawsuit. 
When each return of capital from the Timber Knoll project 
was received, G&A decided to deposit a few thousand 
dollars in Red Hawk's checking account to cover 
anticipated administrative expenses and to return the 
remainder to the limited partners. Henkels seeks to compel 
return of those distributions to Red Hawk for application to 
a default judgment it later obtained against Red Hawk. 
 
During the period from January to August 1989, Red 
Hawk had satisfied its entire capital commitment to the 
Chestnut Woods joint venture, and it had no significant 
liabilities of any kind. It was receiving reports from Cedar 
Ridge that site improvements, after some initial delays, 
were progressing. Cedar Ridge estimated at the start of this 
period (i.e., December 1988) that, even without 
improvements, the entire property could be sold for 
approximately $78,000 per lot, i.e., $1.8 million. At the end 
of this period (i.e., August 1989), the Chestnut Woods 
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project was appraised at $2.7 million. It is undisputed that 
Red Hawk had significant net worth throughout this period. 
 
The district court found it significant that Red Hawk and 
its partners understood that site improvements were on- 
going during the period from January to July 1989 and 
that the Chestnut Woods joint venture was, accordingly, 
incurring liabilities. It did not find, however, that this joint 
venture was insolvent during this period. To the contrary, 
the record relevant to this period indicates that the 
liabilities of the Chestnut Woods joint venture did not 
exceed $1.7 million, that it thus remained solvent, and that 
trade creditors were being paid on a current basis. In 
particular, all invoices that were submitted to Cedar Ridge 
by Henkels during this period were paid in full. 
 
New Jersey's Uniform Limited Partnership Law provides 
that a partner may not receive a distribution from a limited 
partnership "to the extent that, after giving effect to the 
distribution, all liabilities of the limited partnership, other 
than liabilities to partners on account of their partnership 
interests, exceed the fair value of the partnership assets." 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 42:2A-45. This is the sole mandatory 
restriction in the law for the benefit of partnership creditors 
on distributions to partners. Any additional restriction for 
the benefit of creditors must thus be one voluntarily 
undertaken by the Red Hawk partners in their partnership 
agreement. 
 
Our court today holds that the Red Hawk partners, 
although mandating a pass-through to themselves of cash 
receipts, intended in Section 12(a) of their partnership 
agreement voluntarily to impose on themselves a very 
significant restriction for the benefit of joint venture 
creditors. This voluntary restriction, the court holds by 
necessary implication, was intended to be sufficiently broad 
that a distribution could not be made to Red Hawk partners 
unless cash reserves had been established to fund the 
payment of all anticipated future liabilities of the joint 
venture partnerships (owned in part by others) that might 
accrue over some unspecified period of time, even though 
those other partnerships were expected to pay their own 
liabilities with their own or borrowed funds. The record 
suggests no reason, however, why the partners, when 
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setting up the Red Hawk partnership, would have imposed 
such an unnecessary and ill-defined burden on themselves, 
and the text of Section 12(a) does not require such a 
conclusion that they did. 
 
The court resolves the central issue in this appeal in one 
sentence: Section 12(a)(iv) "of the Red Hawk partnership 
agreement specifically provided that cash receipts be used 
for the establishment of reasonable reserves (for creditors) 
before such receipts be distributed to the [limited 
partners]." Slip opinion at 10. Because Red Hawk's general 
partner had reason to believe that Henkels might submit 
invoices in the future for site improvement work, the court 
accordingly concludes that the three challenged 
distributions violated Section 12(a)(iv). 
 
In my view, the court errs for at least five reasons: (1) In 
context, Section 12(a)(iv) was intended for the protection of 
the limited partners, not as a creditor protection device 
even for creditors of Red Hawk; (2) Section 12(a)(iv), even if 
viewed as a creditor protection provision, was not intended 
for the protection of joint venture creditors for whom the 
joint ventures were to make other provision; (3) the 
challenged distributions were a return of capital that the 
partners had agreed to devote to an abandoned venture, 
and it is not reasonable to find an intent in Section 12(a)(iv) 
to commit that capital contribution to the creditors of a 
different, fully capitalized venture; (4) Section 12(a)(iv) 
permits the general partner to retain reserves only from 
"Cash Receipts derived from the operations of the Property" 
and the challenged distributions did not come from funds 
generated by operations;1 and (5) even if Section 12(a)(iv) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court correctly found that the three payments 
representing a return of the capital committed to the Timber Knoll joint 
venture did not constitute a "cash receipt from the operations of the 
Property." It inexplicably concluded from this, however, that the general 
partner was thus "plainly obligated" to follow the terms of Section 
12(a)(iv) and establish a reserve for anticipated future liabilities to 
Henkels. At the time the Red Hawk partnership agreement was 
negotiated, the parties were not, of course, anticipating the 
abandonment of the Timber Knoll venture, and the"notwithstanding" 
clause does not literally read as applying to a return of capital that 
does 
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could reasonably be read to require Red Hawk's general 
partner to set aside funds for creditors in Henkels' position 
whenever a reasonable general partner exercising business 
judgment would do so, this record provides no basis for a 
conclusion that the failure of Red Hawk's general partner to 
set aside funds for Henkels in January through July of 
1989 was a decision beyond the bounds of business 
judgment. 
 
I would reverse and remand with instructions to enter 
judgment for the defendants. 
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not result from a sale of the joint venture property. Nevertheless, I 
believe the intent behind the provision governing such sales, and the 
provisions strictly limiting the objectives of the partnership to 
participation in specified joint ventures with specified capitalization, 
required a pass-through of the payments from the Timber Knoll joint 
venture. But whether or not this is the case, Ifind no authority in the 
agreement for the establishment of reserves other than out of operating 
revenues. 
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